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ABSTRACT
The concept of mixed strategies greatly extends the opportunity to
obtain optimum strategies for discrete two-person game theory but intro-
duces probability considerations. That is, the payoffs to the players
can have probability distributions. This complicates the determination
of optimum strategies. However, this determination can be greatly simp-
lified by only considering some reasonable kind of "representative value"
for a distribution. The distribution mean is used in the expected-value
approach. Another reasonable choice is the distribution median, and this
is the basis for median game theory. The median approach not only can be
applied to the payoffs for each player but also to the possible outcomes
(pairs of payoffs, one to each player) for the game. Application of the
median approach to the payoffs for each player yields some results that
are much more widely applicable than those for expected-value game theory.
Median results that are generally usable, for virtually all types of pay-
offs, are developed by applying the median approach to outcomes. The
median approach has strong application advantages, of several kinds, over
the expected-value approach. The research results obtained to date are
stated, somewhat more generally than they were originally given, and are
discussed. Also, anticipated extensions are outlined.
J
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INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION
The situation considered is that of two players, each of whom has
the choice of a finite number of strategies. Separately and independ-
ently, each player selects one of his strategies. A known pair of pay-
offs, one to each player, is associated with every combination of strat-
egy choices for the players. These pairs are called the outcomes of the
game. The payoffs to a player for the various strategy combinations can
be stated conveniently in matrix form, where the rows correspond to his
strategies and the columns to the strategies of the other player. Both
payoff matrices are known to the players.
When a player assigns probabilities to his strategies and makes the
selection randomly (according to these probabilities), he is said to use
a mixed strategy. The concept of mixed strategies introduces probabil-
istic aspects into game theory. When at least one player selects his
strategy randomly, the payoff to each player has a probability distribu-
tion (determined by the probabilities used by the players). Knowledge
of these distributions is the maximum information that can possibly be
obtained about the payoffs to the players.
A fundamental problem of game theory is determination of optimum
mixed strategies for the players. More specifically, the problem is to
make an optimum choice for the probabilities that determine the mixed
strategies, where unit probabilities are possible (and represent definite
choice of strategy). Such a determination is, unfortunately, subject
to many complications when all the properties of probability distribu-
tions are taken into consideration. However, determination of an opti-
1
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mum choice can be greatly simplified by only considering some kind of
"representative value" for a distribution. The well known expected-
value approach uses the distribution mean (the expected payoff to the
player) as the representative value. For zero-sum games, the situation
is essentially one-dimensional for outcomes (one payoff of a pair de-
termines the other), so that consideration of expected payoffs is equi-
valent to consideration of expected outcomes.
Another reasonable way to represent a (univariate) distribution is
by its median. This is the basis for median game theory. For the first
approach, the payoff matrices are considered separately. within each
matrix, the payoffs are ranked according to increasing desirability, and
the situation is such that the resulting rankings are the same for both
players. The median of payoffs to a player is considered (with respect
to the ordering). For the second approach, the outcomes are fist order-
ed according to relative desirability separately by each player. These
orderings need not be even roughly the same. The median of outcomes is
considered (with respect to the ordering for the player). Situations
can occur that involve both approaches.
A strong advantage of median game theory is that the payoff "values"
can be of a very general nature. The allowable kinds of payoffs are
more restricted for the first approach, due to the condition that the
rankings are the same for both players. The only condition for the se-
cond approach is that the outcomes can be ranked by each player. For
both approaches, some or all of the payoffs need not even be numbers
(for example, some payoffs may designate categories). A ranking, of pay-
offs or outcomes, should nearly always be possible on a paired comparison
basis (with equal desirability as one possibility).
Ij
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The first approach has advantages over the second approach with
regard to necessity for evaluation of payoffs. All the payoff "values"
I
ordinarily need to be determined for the second approach. Knowledge of
the relative ranking within each matrix, combined with "values" for at
most two payoffs in each matrix (which can be identified by the ranking),
is sufficient for the first approach. The effort needed for evaluating
payoffs can be a very important practical consideration (ref.l).
An important advantage of the second approach is its generality of
application. Not only is it usable for virtually all kinds of payoffs
but also optimum solutions, for both players, are obtainable for all
a
cases where the outcomes can be ranked. Moreover, situations that are
only partially competitive or not competitive, in the behavior of the players,
can be handled by a suitably chosen method for ranking the outcomes.
A competitive viewpoint is adopted in developing the results for
the first approach. An optimum solution occurs for a player if and only
if the game situation is median competitive for him (called one player
median competitive: OPMC). The class of games that are OPMC for both
players is a small subset of the set of all games. Even the class that
is oPMC for at least one player is a small subset of all games. Thus,
the first approach has strong disadvantages (compared to the second
approach) with respect to generality of application. However, its advan-
tage with respect to application effort suggests that the first approach
	 i
a
be considered for possible use when a competitive viewpoint occurs for i
both players. a.
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A combination of the two approaches can occur when the viewpoint
is competitive but the situation is not OPMC for both players. Then
outcomes are ordered according to increasing desirability, separately
for each player. However, the group with maximum desirability is deter- 	
!i
8
mined from OPMC considerations. Within this group, only ranking of
payoffs for each player, and "values" of at most two identified payoffs
a
for each player, need to be determined. Substantially less effort than 	 a
would be required to evaluate all payoffs is sometimes sufficient when
results based on this combination of the approaches are used.
Both approaches have appreciable application advantages over ex-
pected-value game theory, with .respect to the classes of games where
they are usable and in the effort needed for their application. Games
that satisfy the zero-sum condition (and slight modifications), which
leads to optimum solutions for discrete two-person game theory of an
expected-value mature, are included among the median competitive games.
Moreover, they are a very small subset of the median competitive games.
Also, expected-value game theory requires accurate evaluation of all
(or nearly all) payoffs. Median game theory is generally applicable and
can often be used without accurate evaluation of more than a small
fraction of the payoffs. A discussion of the application advantages of
median game theory over expected-value game theory is given in ref. 1
(also see refs. 2, 3, 4, 5).
The results that have been developed for the first approach are
outlined in the next section. Then, the results for the second approach
are described in the following section (including a combination of the
two approaches). The next to last section reports on some results where
cooperation is possible. The final section outlines some anticipated
I
-I	 extensions of median game theory.
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RESULTS FOR FIRST APPROACH
For brevity, the desirability of a payoff and the "value" of a pay-
!
off are used interchangeably in the remainder of this paper. The origi-
nal results were stated in terms of payoff values, with the payoffs be-
ing numbers. This paper extends the applicability of these results to
i
situations where relative desirability can be determined among payoffs, 	 d
s
and the resulting ordering of payoffs is the same for both players. 	 1
When the viewpoint is competitive (as considered for the first ap-
proach), the concepts of a player acting protectively, or vindictively,
are useful in determining optimum strategies (ref. 2). That is, a
protective player tries to maximize his payoff, regardless of the payoff
to the other player. A vindictive player attempts to minimize the pay-
off to the other player, without consideration of his own payoff. When
a player has a strategy whereby he can be simultaneously protective and
vindictive, this is considered to be an optimum strategy for him.
The player are designated as I and II. It is always true that: A
largest value P I ( P II ) occurs in the payoff matrix for player I (II)
such that, when acting protectively, he can assure at least this payoff
with probability at least 1/2. Also, a smallest value PI (PI I ) occurs
in the matrix for player I (II) such that vindictive player II (I) can
assure, with probability at least 1/2, that player I (II) receives at
most this payoff. Here, PI 5 P I and P	 P 	 equality possible.
A method for evaluation of P I , PII , P I, PI I is given in Appendix A.
Also given there is a procedure for determining a median optimum strategy
	 i.
I
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for player I (II) when he is acting protectively, and for determining a
median optimum strategy for player I (II) when he is acting vindictively.
Payoff matrices exist such that a player can be simultaneously pro-
tective and vindictive. This occurs if and only if the game situation
is OPMC for him. Specifically, let set I (II) consist of those outcomes
such that the payoff to player I (II) is at least P I (PII ) and the pay-
off to player II (I) is at most PI I (P I ). A game is OPMC for player I
(II) if and only if player I (II) can assure, with probability at least
1/2, that some outcome in set I (II) occurs. A game is median competi-
tive if and only if it is OPMC for both players. These results are taken
from ref. 3. A subclass of the median competitive games is identified
in ref. 2. A method of determining whether a game is OPMC for a speci-
fied player is given in Appendix A. Also given there is method for de-
termining a median optimum strategy for a player when the game is OPMC
for him.
When a game is not OPMC for player I (II), an optimum solution, for
him, can be obtained by suitably supplementing the outcomes of set I (II)
with additional outcomes, until the first time some outcome of the aug-
mented s ,.^t can be assured with probability at least 1/2. This method is
an example of the second approach for the special case of a competit-Lve
viewpoint, and is considered in the next section.
^I
a
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RESULTS FOR SECOND APPROACH
The case of suitably supplem-.nting sets I a'A II is considered first.
Specifically, each player chooses a suitable "relative desirability"
function for ordering the outcomes. These functions have the special
property that all outcomes of set I (II) have maximum desirability for
player I (II). Further, where ( p I, pII) denotes a general outcome, a
condition on player I is that his relative desirability is a nonincreas-
ing function of P I - pI for fixed p II - PI I , and a nonincreasing func-
tion of pII - PI I for fixed PI - p I . Likewise, for player II, relative
desirability is a nonincreasing function of PII - pII for fixed p I - PI,
and a nonincreasing function of p  - PI for fixed P 1 - pII' These con-
ditions are motivated by the competitive viewpoint. The material using
this kind of relative desirability function is taken from ref, 4.
The preceding method for ordering outcomes according to ir,.reasing
desirability is a special case of the second approach. Actually, each
player could use almost any possible way that results in an ordering of
the outcomes. However, if (p I' pII) is a general outcome, virtually
any ordering method should have the property that, for player I (II),
relative desirability is a nondecreasing function of p  (pII) for a fixed
value of pII (p I). Once an ordering according to increasing desirability
has been determined for player I (II), he can identify a smallest set
of outcomes S  (SII ) such that the other outcomes are less desirable
and such that he can assure an outcome of S  (S II ) with probability at	 l 1
/1
y
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least 1/2. A method for determining S  and S II is outlined in Appendix
B. A way of determining median optimum strategies is also given there.
This material using general ways of establishing relative desirability
is based on a method given in ref, 5.
These results are optimum, according to the median criterion, when
the players choose their strategies separately and independently. Cases
where the players can cooperate in the selection of their strategies
offer additional possibilities and are discussed in the next section.
CASES WITH COOPERATION
Use of median game theory may not be advantageous when the players
can cooperate in the choice of strategies. That is, the players may be
able to guarantee a game outcome that is more desirable, to both, than
use of solutions that are medium optimum for the case of no cooperation.
Some situations where cooperation is definitely preferable are
identified in ref, 5. Two types of cooperation are considexed. No side
payments are made for one type. Cooperation of this type can occuz for
any situation where median game theory is applicable (first or second
approach). Side payments can be made for the other type of cooperation.
This type can occur for situations where all !,?ayoffs can be expressed
i
in a common unit and satisfy the arithemetical operations.
Suppose that the outcomes have been ordered according to increas-
ing desirability, separately for each player (as for the second appro:%.7*1).
Then sets S  and 
S11 are determined by optimum use of median game theory
(as in the preceding section). General Rule: Cooperation is definitely
preferable when an acievable outcome exists that is at least as desirable
-10-
to player I as one or more outcomes in S  and also is at least as desir-
able to player II as one or more outcomes in S Ii . Here, the achievable
outcomes are the possible outcomes when side payments are not made.
When side payments can be made, any pair of payoffs whose sum equals
the sum for a possible outcome is considered to be an achievable outcome.
Some implications of this rule are discussed in ref. 5. Coopera-
tion can be definitely preferable for many situations that are median
competitive. However cooperation•is seldom useful when the game is of
a competitive type. (A game is competitive when the totality of out-
comes can be arranged so that the payoffs to player I are nondecreas-
ing and also the payoffs to player II are nonincreasing.). Coopera-
tion tends to be more attractive when side payments can he made. In
fact, cooperation often is preferable to median game theory when side
payments can be made.
ANTICIPATED EXTENSIONS
Many extensions of median game are being carried out or are planned.
Generally applicable two-person percentile game theory, where each player
decides on the percentile he uses, is being developed using relative
desirability orderings like those of the second approach. This seems
to be directly extendable to generally applicable N-person percentile
game theory where the players choose their strategies separately and
independently. Identification of cases where cooperation is definitely
preferable will be considered for these more general results. This iden-
tification can be very complicated for N-person games. Also, difficul-
ties in practical application seem to be very important for N-person
games.
5
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Percentile (including median) game theory has difficulties in suit-
3
ably allowing for the sizes of highly desirable and highly undesirable
payoffs and outcomes. Ways of doing this more meaningfully are being
developed.
Game theory in which a player simultaneously considers two or more
percentiles for use, and cnooses one according to probabilities he spec- 	 j
ifies, is under consideration. Optimum choice of the probabilities for
the percentiles, combined with use of an optimum strategy for the percen-
tile chosen, may tend to strongly increase the desirability of the out-
come that occurs.
Another direction for extensions is cases where one or more players
do not know the percentiles being used by one or more of the players.
This can be important whether cooperation is allowed or not.	 ?
Other possibilities such as extension to the continuous case also
s
exist. This field is just starting its development and a multitude of
r
worthwhile results should be developed over the next few years.
APPENDIX ii
Determination of values for PI' PII' PI' PII is considered first.
This can be accomplished by marking of some of the values in the payoff
matrices. The method given here is the simplification of the procedure
in ref. 2 that is introduced in ref. 3 (and is not based on development
and use of preferred sequences).
For player I (IT) acting protectively, first mark the position(s)
in his matrix of the largest payoff value. Then also mark the position(s)
of the next to largest payoff value. Continue this marking, accord-
4
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ing to decreasing payoff value, until the first time that marks in all
the columns can be obtained from two or fewer of the rows (then a marked
value can be assured with probability at least 1/2, perhaps greater than
1/2). Now, remove the mark(s). for the smallest of the payoffs used
I
and (by the following method) determine whether some one of the remain-
ing marks can be assured with probability at least 1/2. This cannot
occur unless there are still marks in all the columns. When all columns
are still marked, replace every marked payoff by the value unity and
every unmarked payoff by zero. Consider the resulting matrix of ones
and zeroes to be for a zero-sum game with expected-value basis and solve
for the value of this game to player I (II). Some one of the remaining 	 i
marks can be obtained with probability at least 1/2 if and only if this
game value is at least 1/2.
When protective player I (II) cannot assure a remaining mark with
probability at least 1/2, the value of P I (P II ) is the payoff value in	 a
the matrix of player I (II) that had its marking(s) removed last.
Otherwise (a game value of at least 1/2), those of the remaining marks
that correspond to the smallest of the remaining marked payoffs are
removed. Then, as just discussed, determine whether some one of the
marks remaining now can be assured with probability at least 1/2. If
not, P I (PII ) equals the payoff in the matrix of player I (II) that had
its marking(s) removed last. If a probability of at least 1/2 can be
t
assured, continue in the same way (removing the mark(s) for the smallest
of the remaining payoffs with marks) until the first time that some one
of the remaining marks cannot be assured with probability at least 1/2.
Then P I (PII ) is the payoff in the matrix of player I (II) that had its
-13-
marking(s) removed last. It is to be noted that P I and PII are often
the payoffs which provided the first time that two or fewer rows con-
tained marks in all columns of the respective matrices.
For player I (II) acting vindictively, first mark the position(s)
in the matrix for player II (I) of the smallest payoff value. Then
also mark the position(s) of the next to smallest payoff value. Con-
tinue this marking, according to increasing payoff value, until the
first time that marks in all the rows can be obtained from two or fewer
of the columns (assures that a marked value can be obtained with proba-
bility at least 1/2). Next remove the marks for the largest of the pay-
offs used and (by the following method) determine whether some one of
the remaining marks can be assured with probability at least 1/2. This
is not possible unless there are still marks in all the rows. When all
rows still contain marks, replace every marked payoff by the value zero
and every unmarked payoff by unity. The resulting matrix of ones and
zeroes is considered to be for a zero-sum game with an expected value
basis, with rows corresponding to strategies for player II (I). Solve
this game for its value to player II (I). Some one of the remaining
marks can be obtained with probability at least 1/2 by player I (II) if
and only if this game value is at most 1/2.
When vindictive player I (II) cannot assure a remaining mark with
probability at least 1/2, the value of PI I (PI) is the payoff value in
the matrix of player II (I) that had its marking removed last. Other-
wise (a game value of at most 1/2), those of the remaining marks that
correspond to the largest of the remaining marked payoffs are removed.
,
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Then, as just discussed, determine whether some one of the marks still
remaining can be assured by player I (II) with probability at least 1/2.
If not, PII (PI) equals the payoff in the matrix of player II (I) that
had its marking(s) removed last. If a probability of at least 1/2 can
be assured, continue in the same manner (removing the mark(s) for the
largest of the remaining payoffs with marks) until the first time that
some one of the remaining marks cannot be assured by player I (II)
with probability at least 1/2. Then PI I (PI) is the payoff in the mat-
rix of player II (I) that had its marking(s) removed last. Often, PII
and PI are the payoffs which furnished the first time that two or fewer
columns contained marks in all the rows of the respective matrices.
Consider determination of a median optimum strategy for player I (II)
when he acts protectively. Let all payoffs with value at least PI (PII)
in the matrix for player I (II) be replaced by unity and all other pay-
offs replaced by zero. The resulting matrix of ones and zeroes is con-
sidered to be for a zero-sum game with an expected-value basis. An opti-
mum strategy for player I (II) in this game is a protective median opti-
mum strategy for him.
Now consider determination of a median optimum strategy for player
I (II) when he acts vindictively. Let all payoffs with values at most
PII (PI) in the matrix for player II (I) be replaced by zero and all
other payoffs replaced by unity. This matrix of ones and zeroes is used
for a zero-sum game with an expected-value basis. An optimum strategy
is determined for player I (II) in the game where the matrix (ones and
zeroes) for player II (I) is used. This is a vindictive median optimum
strategy for player I (II).
-15-
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To determine whether a OPMC situation occurs for player I (II),
mark the positions of his matrix for his payoffs in the outcomes of set
I (II). If marks in all columns can be obtained from two or fewer rows,
the situation is automatically OPMC for player I (II), If at least one
column contains no marks, the situation is not OPMC for player I (II),
Otherwise, replace every marked payoff by unity and every unmarked pay-
off by zero. Consider the resulting matrix to be for a zero-sum game
with an expected value basis. The situation is OPMC for player I (II)
if and only if the value of this game is at least 1/2.
Now, consider determination of an optimum strategy for player I (II)
when the situation is OPMC for him. Use the same marking as for the
preceding paragraph and replace marked values by unity and unmarked values
by zero. Again treat the resulting matrix as a zero-sum game with an
expected value basis. An optimum strategy for player I (II) in this
zero-sum game is a median optimum OPMC strategy for that player. The
probability that player I (II) receives at least P I (PII ) and simultan-
eously player II (I) receives at most PI I (PI) is at least equal to
the game value. This method of choosing a median optimum OPMC strategy
tends to maximize the game value and also tends to minimize the appli-
cation effort. Other methods based on choice of a preferred sequence
order for the pairs of payoffs (see ref.2) can be developed in a straight-
forward manner, but only this method is considered here.
Y
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APPENDIX B
Determination of S I (SII ) is very similar to determination of
PI (PII ). The only difference is that the markings are made according to
the ranking of the outcomes by player I (II) instead of according to
the payoffs to player I (II). That is, for player I (II), first mark
the position(s) in his matrix for the payoff(s) in the outcome(s) with
t
highest desirability. Then also mark the position(s) for the payoff(s)
in the outcome(s) with the next to highest desirability. Continue this
marking, according to decreasing desirability, and use the method for
evaluating P I (P II ) to determine the smallest set of marked positions
such that a marked position can be assured with probability at least
1/2 and such that outcomes with unmarked payoffs are less desirable
than those with marked payoffs. The resulting outcomes with marked pay-:'"
offs constitute S I (SII ) for player I (II).
To determine a median optimum strategy for player I (II) in the
second approach, let all payoffs in his matrix that belong to outcomes
of S  (SII ) be replaced by unity and all other payoffs replaced by
zero. The resulting matrix of ones and zeroes is considered to be for
a zero-sum game with an expected-value basis. An optimum strategy fo;
player I (II) in this game is median optimum for him.
1	 .
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